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  • Writer's pictureThe Commandant Student Journal

Determinants of environmentally induced conflict: The climate-migration and conflict nexus


We have reached a watershed moment in the history of humanity. The recent report provided to the UN by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that previous empirical findings that ‘human-induced climate change’ (2022) is affecting the natural environment and impacting the lives of global citizens at a rapid pace (Abel, et al., 2019). Extreme climatic events are increasing in intensity and frequency and having a deleterious impact on human security—the interrelated conceptual understanding that all individuals should be: (1) safe from threats such as repression, hunger, and disease; (2) protected from unexpected disruptions to daily routines that may be detrimental to the victim (Abel et al. 2019; Burrows and Kinney 2016; Paris, 2001). The securitisation of climate change has reframed the issue from an environmental collective action problem to a global security threat.


Environmental change can produce societal divisions, as resource scarcity can drive both migration and potentially violent conflict across the globe. The pressure that the environment-migration-conflict nexus engenders can be seen in the tightening of international border crossings (Rose, 2021). Increasing detentions of transnational migrants opting to illegally cross the U.S.–Mexico border have amplified calls to restrict entry, accompanied by a militarisation of border officials. This observation reveals a few questions: what is driving this migratory behaviour; and does it have the potential to culminate in further conflict in the region? Human-induced environmental degradation threatens human security as it constrains the socio-political and economic opportunities with implications on migratory behaviour and increases the likelihood of potential violent conflict. (Brzoska and Frohlich, 2016)

The conception of human security initially outlined in the 1994 Human Development Report tabled by the UN was quite narrow, focused on external threats and upholding the protective interests of national security. Newer iterations of the concept have only served to broaden the scope of understanding and provide a more inclusive framework comprised of economic, political, social, personal, health, and food security threats and how they are applied to the individual as well as the state (Paris, 2001). Under this expanded conceptualisation, the climate is now understood as another mechanism that impacts human security (Burrows and Kinney, 2016).

When assessing the anthropogenic factors that impact climate change it is helpful to look at key indicators, or measurements, of change (Abel et al., 2019; Abrahams, 2020; Brzoska and Frohlich, 2016; Burrows and Kinney, 2016; Reuveny, 2007). Human-induced change is responsible for more than half of the increase in global average surface temperatures that have been observed in the last 65 years. However, there are limitations in using temperature variability alone to assess change (Abel et al. 2019). The increased average temperatures can stimulate climatic events like droughts and floods—additional mechanisms to measure change on human-security (Burrows and Kinney, 2016). Moreover, the severity of floods and droughts has a negative impact on food production and water access. The resultant food and water shortages can create competition over scarce resources which can exacerbate endogenous cleavages and potentially promote distrust and ethnic tension, influencing migration and conflict (Brzoska and Frohlich, 2016; Burrows and Kinney, 2016; Reuveny, 2007).

The climatic implications shaping scarcity illuminate human-security issues that also have consequences on internal and external displacement. Large numbers of people can be displaced because of increasing average temperatures and successive extreme weather events. Drought—and subsequent land degradation—are slow-onset events that typically result in long-term migratory behaviours. Conversely, flooding is considered a short-term event that creates internal displacement (Brzoska and Frohlich, 2016). Delay of onset notwithstanding, the causal link between climatic change and migration is well established. A reduction in the food supply creates competition over scarce resources resulting in internal displacement and mass flight, however, what is less understood is whether climate change—and the negative implications for human security that it elucidates—leads to violent conflict (Abel et al. 2019; Abrahams, 2020; Brzoska and Frohlich, 2016).


Environmentally induced population movements can lead to violent conflict. Limited resources constrain the population exposing underlying inequalities (Brzoska and Frohlich, 2016; Reuveny, 2007). Those most disaffected by internal displacement, conflict, or both, may seek refuge in neighbouring countries which also puts pressure on the “infrastructure, services, and economy” (Abel et al., 2019) of receiving countries, which could lead to destabilisation and inter-state conflict. There is also a positive correlational association between human-induced climate change and conflict that exists independently of migration as a proxy for conflict. In a quantitative meta-analysis (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel, 2015) of over fifty studies examining the relationship between climate and violent conflict, researchers demonstrated with every one degree of variable increase in average temperature there exists a corresponding increase in the likelihood of intergroup conflict (14%) and interpersonal violence (4%).


When assessing environmental push factors in the context of those seeking refuge in the United States from equatorial zones, climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ (Abrahams 2020). Key indicators, such as drought severity and flooding, point to an increased likelihood of climate precipitated change. North and South American data have shown sustained above-average temperatures for the last 24 and 44 years respectively, with last year averages 1.16–1.40 degrees (C) above normal (NOAA, 2021). In an analysis of climactic events between 1975-2001, Reuveny (2007) found that Latin America experienced the second largest number of floods, and the third largest number of droughts, affecting between 40 and 50 million people. The increasing prevalence of these events puts enormous pressure on resources that have implications for internal displacement and external population shifts. This is evident in recent migratory behaviours measured by encounters—that is apprehensions and expulsions—at the southwest border with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials (Gramlich, 2021). Over 200,000 encounters were recorded in July of 2021, a 20 year high. Increasingly, the ratio of that formerly favoured expulsion by a factor of 9 has reduced in half to favouring apprehensions in only one year (Gramlich, 2021). This has the potential to increase tensions and devolve into violent conflict as desperation overrides other sentiments.


Nonetheless, we must be careful in drawing causal inferences from the relationship between these concepts and many confounding factors may influence the association between climate and conflict. Endogenous variables may precede environmental conditions that impact migration and violent conflict and exogenous factors such as geography or external shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic may also influence associations.


Human-induced climate change can have a host of human-security implications on the environment-migration-conflict nexus that works both independent and interdependently of one another. With an influx of migrant encounters at the U.S.–Mexico border at a 20 year high the risk associated with violent conflict has increased—evident in increasing use of force interactions over the last three years—especially those involving a firearms and vehicles as weapons (U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency, 2022). Indeed, there exists positive associations between the climate-migration-conflict nexus that make predictions regarding violent conflict more plausible, confounding variables notwithstanding.



Bibliography


Abel, Guy J., Michael Brottrager, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, and Raya Muttarak. 2019. “Climate, Conflict and Forced Migration.” Global Environmental Change 54 (January): 239–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.12.003.


Abrahams, Daniel. 2020. “Conflict in Abundance and Peacebuilding in Scarcity: Challenges and Opportunities in Addressing Climate Change and Conflict.” World Development 132 (August): 104998. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104998.


Brzoska, Michael, and Christiane Fröhlich. 2016. “Climate Change, Migration and Violent Conflict: Vulnerabilities, Pathways and Adaptation Strategies.” Migration and Development 5 (2): 190–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1022973.


Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. 2015. “Climate and Conflict.” Annual Review of Economics 7 (1): 577–617. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115430.


Burrows, Kate, Patrick Kinney. 2016. “Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and Conflict Nexus.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 13 (4): 443. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph13040443.


Gramlich, John. 2021. “Migrant encounters at U.S.-Mexico border are at a 21-year high,” Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/13/migrant-encounters-at-u-s-mexico-border-are-at-a-21-year-high/.


IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of

Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press.


NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, State of the Climate: Global Climate Report for Annual 2020, published online January 2021, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/202013.


Paris, Roland. 2001. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26 (2): 87–102. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141.


Reuveny, Rafael. 2007. “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict.” Political Geography 26 (6): 656–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001.


Rose, Joel. 2021. “Border Patrol apprehensions hit a record high. But that’s only part of the story,” National Public Radio (NPR). https://www.npr.org/2021/10/23/1048522086/border-patrol-apprehensions-hit-a-record-high-but-thats-only-part-of-the-story.


U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency. 2022. Assaults and Use of Force Statistics. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/assaults-use-force.



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